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Political Liberalism, Cultural Membership, and the Family
In a recent article on developments in John Rawls’s theory of justice, 
S.A. Lloyd notes a problem in Rawls’s treatment of the family. In 
Political Liberalism (hereafter PL), Rawls concedes that his theory 
assumes that “in some form the family is just.” 1 And Lloyd takes 
this to mean
that the principles of justice do not require us to abolish families and rather, say, 
rear children collectively in state-run institutions. One might think that the principle 
of fair equality of opportunity would in fact require this, since differences in 
upbringing do differentially affect opportunities; but Rawls assumes that the family 
in some form, appropriately regulated is compatible with his principles of justice.
. . . This is quite interesting, because if we ask why should the institution of the 
family have this special status— why permit the family, but only the family, to 
reciprocally constrain the principles of justice— it is not at all obvious what answer 
Rawls can give.
In this paper, I will defend three claims. First, I argue that Lloyd’s 
query is a serious challenge to Rawls’s theory of justice, and that 
neither Rawls’s answer nor Lloyd’s answer is adequate. Second, I 
claim that appealing to the need for the good of cultural membership 
provides a compelling justification of the family. Finally, I will argue 
that the need for cultural membership provides justification within 
the framework of Rawls’s recent work in PL, but not that of A 
Theory o f Justice (hereafter TOJ)? Far from requiring the upbringing 
of children by the state, Rawls’s later theory all but prohibits it.
We can define “family” for the present discussion in a relatively 
broad and loose way: those cultural institutions that consist of one 
or more adults who are primarily responsible for the upbringing of 
one or more children, and are prototypically (though not essentially) 
comprised of biological relatives of the children in a close and 
affective relationship with the children. While this definition could 
certainly be made more precise, I think a looser notion is best since 
nothing in the present discussion depends on the particular form of 
the family. For present purposes, we need only to be precise enough 
to distinguish the family from other means of raising children such 
as state-run child care.
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In section 1, I detail Lloyd’s challenge and consider constraints 
on a suitable answer. In section 2 , 1 consider some ways to reconcile 
Lloyd’s challenge with Rawls’s conception of justice, but conclude 
that none of the available options provides an adequate answer. In 
section 3, I review arguments showing that Rawls and other liberals 
ought to treat cultural membership as a primary good: something 
everyone can be assumed to want, whatever else they want. In section 
4, I suggest that recognizing the importance of cultural belonging 
can adequately ground Rawls’s special treatment of the family, but 
only within a state organized around a political conception of justice, 
as it is developed in PL. Finally, in section 5, I consider some 
objections to the proposal and offer some clarifications.
1. Lloyd’s Challenge: The Family and the Second Principle
Rawls’s second principle of justice is supposed to constrain the basic 
structure of a society, including the family.5 The second principle is 
broken into two parts. Part (a)—the difference principle—requires 
that inequalities be positioned so as to be the greatest benefit to the 
least advantaged within a society while part (b)—the liberal principle 
of fair equality of opportunity—requires that offices and positions 
of benefit are open to all. Rawls writes that
the reasons for requiring open positions are not solely, or even primarily, those of 
efficiency. . . . For it may be possible to improve everyone’s situation by assigning 
certain powers and benefits to positions despite the fact that certain groups are 
excluded from them.. . .  But the principle of open positions forbids this. It expresses 
the conviction that if some places were not open on a basis fair to all, those kept 
out would be right in feeling unjustly treated even though they benefited from the 
greater efforts of those who were allowed to hold them. They would be justified 
in their complaint not only because they were excluded from certain external rewards 
of office such as wealth and privilege, but because they were debarred from 
experiencing the realization of self which comes from a skillful and devoted exercise 
of social duties. They would be deprived of one of the main forms of human good.
On Rawls’s view, even a better position for the worst off does not 
justify denying them fair equality of opportunity. He incorporates 
these thoughts succinctly in the requirement that the principle of fair 
equality of opportunity get priority over the difference principle.7
Given that the institutions of a well-ordered society will be 
structured by the two principles, Rawls appears to permit a real 
anomaly in sanctioning the family. As Lloyd points out, there is a 
sense in which the family is singular within the basic structure since 
the family itself undermines equality in a way inconsistent with 
Rawls’s second principle of justice. Since different families will offer
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different opportunities, different amounts of parental skill and parental 
investment, different numbers of siblings and other relatives, different 
immediate communities, and even different quantities of love, they 
cannot help but differentially affect children’s life prospects. More­
over, given the early and formative nature of these conditions, we 
can expect that such inequalities could be magnified many times 
over as the children grow and pursue their various life paths and 
conceptions of the good.
When one conceives of a good familial situation as a position 
with certain benefits attached, it is clear that these positions are not 
“open to all.” Nor do potential benefits to those deprived provide 
adequate redress for this unfair distribution. While such differing 
familial situations might not exactly offer different opportunities for 
the “skillful and devoted exercise of social duties,” they do offer 
different opportunities for the realization of the self. Moreover, as 
mentioned above, such differences will potentially radically affect 
one’s life chances. So, it appears that Rawls’s second principle entails 
that the family ought to be abolished in order to better equalize 
opportunities for all involved.
Rawls himself seems to be very cognizant of the tension between 
equality and the family in TOJ. On the one hand, Rawls realizes 
the central importance of the family in equipping one with the 
appropriate moral, emotional, and conceptual equipment to be suc­
cessful in the world. Rawls writes that
[t]he extent to which natural capacities develop and reach fruition is affected by 
all kinds of social conditions and class attitudes. Even the willingness to make an 
effort, to try, and so to be deserving in the ordinary sense is itself dependent upon 
happy family and social circumstances.
But for the very reason of its importance, the family is a barrier to 
the satisfaction of the principle of fair equality of opportunity:
Even in a well-ordered society that satisfies the two principles of justice, the family 
may be a barrier to equal chances between individuals. For as I have defined it, 
the second principle only requires equal life prospects in all sectors of society for 
those similarly endowed and motivated. If  there are variations among families in 
the same sector in how they shape the child’s aspirations, then while fair equality 
of opportunity may obtain between sectors, equal chances between individuals will 
not. This possibility raises the question as to how far the notion of equality of 
opportunity can be carried.
The family seems to, in Lloyd’s terminology, place reciprocal con­
straints upon justice: Rawls means to allow the family that is “a 
barrier to equal chances among individuals” to continue as an
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institution within the basic structure. But what possible reason could 
justify this special treatment of the family? Any appeal to justify 
familial inequality in virtue of the overall value of families to society 
would be inconsistent with Rawls’s commitment to individuals. At 
the same time, sentiments favoring the family are so widespread and 
deeply held that if Rawls’s conception of justice does entail the 
abolition of the family, his theory is far less appealing than many 
have supposed.
Given the prima facie incompatibility of the family with the second 
principle and strong intuitions favoring the family, we have two 
options for answering Lloyd’s challenge. First, we can argue that 
despite appearances, the family is compatible with the two principles. 
We can do this if, for some reason, the family is necessary to, or 
an inevitable part of, a well-ordered society. In Section 2, I consider 
arguments to show that attempt to reconcile the special status of the 
family with the principle of fair equality of opportunity, and conclude 
that they are inadequate.
The second option for answering Lloyd’s challenge is to allow 
that the two principles as stated are incomplete, and that the con­
ception of justice we accept must be more rich to accommodate the 
special status of the family.
Rawls’s idea of “wide reflective equilibrium” is useful here.10 
Our principles of justice should, on the one hand, reflect our con­
sidered moral judgments. On the other hand, they should also have 
the capacity to cause us to revise those judgments. Rawls achieves 
this by suggesting that neither our moral intuitions nor our principles 
of justice are epistemologically privileged. Rather, we adjust some­
times one and sometimes the other to achieve the best overall fit.
We adjust our moral judgments by revising them in light of our 
principles, and we adjust our principles by either altering the speci­
fication of the original position or by deciding that the choice parties 
in the original position should make is different from what we 
thought. When we have reached the point at which our principles 
match our moral judgments after considering all possible cases, argu­
ments, and evidence, we have achieved wide reflective equilibrium.
If we are unable to show that the family is compatible with the 
two principles as stated, we can attempt to accommodate our strong 
preferences for the family by arguing that a conception of justice 
protecting the family would be chosen by the parties to the contractual 
situation (what Rawls calls the “original position”) or by altering 
the specification of the conditions under which the choice of a
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conception of justice is made. In Section 3 and the remainder of 
the paper, I pursue the former route, arguing that the family ensures 
a primary good—cultural membership—that the state cannot, in prin­
ciple, provide. Moreover, this good is important enough to override 
the principle of fair equality of opportunity. As such, the parties in 
the original position ought to choose a conception of justice that 
protects the special status of the family. While this defense requires 
adding to Rawls’s conception of justice, it is, I believe, generally 
compatible with it. .
2. Some Arguments for the Family
It would be preferable if the special status that Rawls grants to the 
family were compatible with his conception of justice as it stands. 
This would be the case, for example, if the family were somehow 
a necessary or inevitable part of the basic structure of a well-ordered 
society. Rawls seems to assume this, but does not explain why. In 
this section, I will consider three attempts to answer Lloyd’s 
challenge: that of Rawls, that of Lloyd, and another suggested by 
the work of Laurence Thomas. I will argue that none of them can 
reconcile the special status of the family with the two principles.
a. Rawls’s Answer
While Rawls seems acutely aware of the implications of the principle 
of equality of opportunity for the special status of the family, the 
explanation he provides is unsatisfactory by his own criterion. In 
discussing the privileged position of the family within the basic 
structure, Rawls writes:
It seems that even when fair opportunity (as it has been defined) is satisfied, the 
family will lead to unequal chances between individuals (§46). Is the family to be 
abolished then? Taken by itself and given a certain primacy, the idea of equal 
opportunity inclines in this direction. But within the context of the theory of justice 
as a whole, there is much less urgency to take this course. The acknowledgment 
of the difference principle redefines the grounds for social inequalities as conceived 
in the system of liberal equality; and when the principles of fraternity and redress 
are allowed their appropriate weight, the natural distribution o ffs e ts  and the 
contingencies of social circumstances can more easily be accepted.
Rawls recognizes the pull of equality towards the abolition of the 
family, but he suggests that within the well-ordered society the 
inequalities will not be so egregious as they seem, as economic and 
social inequalities will themselves be redressed by the institutions
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required by the difference principle. Rawls’s point seems to be that 
even if you are disadvantaged by your familial setting, the advantages 
which come to those in better circumstances will themselves be re­
distributed in your favor, thus mitigating the morally arbitrary “effects 
of the natural lottery itself.” 1^  Violations of equality of opportunity 
are less egregious in the face of redress of inequalities of outcome.
But by Rawls’s own admission, this kind of explanation by itself 
is not satisfactory. On Rawls’s view, it is not enough that those with 
less opportunity receive material compensation from those who win 
the familial lottery. They are still disadvantaged in experiencing the 
“realization of self’ that would accompany a more beneficial setting 
and the life path that would follow from it. They would, in Rawls’s 
words, “be deprived of one of the main forms of human good.” ^
What we wanted was a justification of the special status of the 
family, but what Rawls offers us is assurance that the inequalities 
of outcome it creates might not be particularly harmful. But by 
Rawls’s own admission, that sort of assurance is inadequate to justify 
violating the principle of fair equality of opportunity. So Rawls ought 
to be led to the conclusion (as he nearly is in the passage above) 
that the family ought to be abolished, and the children raised in 
formally and materially equal circumstances, the benefits of which 
would be open to all.
b. Lloyd’s Answer
Recognizing the gap in Rawls’s account, Lloyd suggests that the 
underlying reason for Rawls’s assumption is that
the moral development of children necessary to their becoming fully cooperating 
citizens requires an intense personal adult-to-child relationship of love and trust, 
and if it is plausible to suppose further that state-run child-rearing institutions would 
be significandy less likely to provide the needed intimate relationship, then the 
reliable reproduction of society over time will require that children be raised in 
families.
If it is a condition upon the existence of a well-ordered society that 
children must be raised in families, then some sort of family structure 
must inevitably exist in the well-ordered society, and the reciprocal 
limits that the family places on justice are justified.
Lloyd thinks that this is the missing lemma in Rawls’s argument, 
since Rawls himself emphasizes in his theory of moral development 
the importance of strong love between parents and adults.15 Since 
the adequate development of moral powers and a sense of justice is 
a sine qua non for a well-ordered society, if the family is needed
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to bring these about, then the family too is a sine qua non. If such 
loving bond is necessary, it should be part of the basic structure of 
the society. Lloyd concludes: “What is missing in Rawls’s account 
as it stands is an argument to the effect that families more reliably 
provide the needed relationship than state institutions could be 
expected to do.” 16
Rawls must show that families “more reliably” provide psycho­
logical prerequisites for moral development than would state 
institutions. In order for the state to displace the family, it is not 
necessary that it provide for moral development better than, or even 
as well as, a good family. Rather, the state need only do what is 
sufficient for the children’s moral development, even if, in many 
cases, the family does the optimum. If a loving relationship is required 
in order to encourage moral development, Rawls must argue that the 
family is justified because it ensures a loving relationship in a way 
the state cannot. It is not required of the state to maximize the love 
a child receives, even if the family does just that.
Rawls is very clear that what is necessary to ensure the stability 
of the state is a “minimum requisite degree” of the moral powers, 
and later he suggests that what is required is that citizens have “at 
least to the essential minimum degree, the moral, intellectual, and 
physical capacities that enable them to be fully cooperating members 
of society over a complete life.” 17 So, if Lloyd’s suggested 
justification of the family is to succeed, then the case needs to be 
made that state-run child care could not provide enough of a loving 
relationship for children to achieve the minimum degree of moral 
development, achieve moral powers that are, in Rawls’s phrase, 
“above the line” of the minimum required.
But this is implausible. To see this, we can take note of the 
widespread practices of foster care and surrogate mothers, daycare, 
baby-sitters and nannies, tutors, and nurses that have long charac­
terized the everyday life of at least some children in many cultures. 
And since now such practices have become widespread in Western 
industrial and post-industrial culture, the loving contact between 
parent and child is increasingly becoming replaced by various 
community and public institutions. Add to the above examples the 
practice of public and private schools as well as that of boarding 
schools (institutions that may act in loco parentis) and the family 
seems to play an increasingly marginal role in the immediate raising 
of a child.18
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On the basis of these examples, it is not clear why the state could 
not easily provide the kind of resources necessary to supplant the 
family in ensuring the adequate moral development of children. It 
might be that the state would need to provide more resources for 
such care than are currently provided, or even raise the standards 
of care above those now offered. But such qualifications do nothing 
to weaken the case that the state could, in principle, do an adequate 
job of raising children such that their moral development progresses 
to the minimum level.
c. Thomas’s Answer
Perhaps to require that the state provide enough love is beside the 
point, though. Perhaps what Lloyd (and Rawls) believe is that the 
parent-child relationship is qualitatively different from any other 
relationship in the child’s life. Laurence Thomas suggests that the 
important feature of the loving parent-child relationship is that the 
love is unconditional or transparent.19 Moreover, he suggests that 
the basis of such love is the evolutionary selection of psychological 
mechanisms that favor such love. He writes that
the significance of such love lies in the fact that such parental love engenders basic 
psychological security on the part of the child, and that this security, in addition 
to allaying or altogether precluding the fear of parental rejection, is one of the keys 
to the child’s flourishing.
Thomas goes on to argue that this psychological security plays an 
essential role in the child’s becoming an autonomous moral being 
since it provides a degree of immunity from the negative social 
opinions of others, immunity that is essential if we are to become 
autonomous moral agents.21 Thomas likens this immunity, this “safe 
zone” of self-esteem, to the way that the confidence brought by past 
achievements can allow one to carry through a current project despite 
disapproval from others.22
If Thomas is correct, it suggests two lines of analysis that bolster 
the general defense of Rawls suggested by Lloyd. First, the uncon­
ditional love provided by a family may very well be essential to a 
child’s upbringing. Insofar as the family is the only source of such 
love, it is an essential institution. Secondly, if Thomas’s sociobi- 
ological analysis is correct, such unconditional love might arise more 
naturally or strongly between biological parents and children. Under 
these circumstances, the family turns out to be essential to the child’s 
adequate moral development and moreover (perhaps) it is the
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biological family that is essential. If so, this provides the needed 
argument for the necessity of the family in a Rawlsian state.
Again, however, we must be mindful that what is required is not 
that we show that alternatives to the family are as good as the family 
in fostering moral development—we need only show that they are 
sufficient. It seems improbable that biological parents are the only 
reliable source of appropriate upbringing. Numerous cases of divorce 
and remarriage, adoption and parental death would seem to rule out 
this suggestion as unlikely. While certainly many children in such 
circumstances face both material and emotional hardship, it is not 
clear that their hardship significantly affects their acquisition of the 
moral powers to the minimum level required, and it is even less 
clear that those who do fall short would continue to do so in a 
society ordered by Rawls’s two principles of justice.
Still, it may be the case that families are necessary, even if 
biological families are not. Thomas’s argument suggests that what 
is important is the unconditional love that parents can provide in a 
close and nurturing relationship with their children. On such an 
account, the various institutions of child-rearing mentioned above do 
not serve to undermine the family’s role, as the essential feature of 
the family is the unconditional love it provides to children in its 
care.
While Thomas’s account has much to recommend it, it remains 
less than convincing. On the one hand, it is not clear that the kind 
of unconditional love Thomas discusses is necessary for children to 
develop their moral powers to the requisite degree. On the other 
hand, it is unclear that they could not receive such love within 
state-run child care.
To begin with, we might wonder to what extent children actually 
receive the kind of unconditional love that Thomas thinks is 
necessary. Certainly many actual people would characterize the 
parental love they received as anything but unconditional. Nonethe­
less, such people generally seem to have developed the moral powers 
to the requisite degree. If this is right, then unconditional love is 
not a necessary condition for adequate moral development.
Even if the quality of parental love is what distinguishes it, it 
doesn’t seem as if the quantity of love—the amount of time spent 
by parents with their children—is irrelevant. After all, they have to 
have some contact for the children to benefit from this distinctive 
parental love. And if this is so, we might again wonder at the 
increasingly limited contact between parents and their children in
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Western post-industrial cultures. Since such children do apparently 
develop their moral powers to the minimum degree, it still seems 
implausible that there is something peculiar to parental love that is 
essential to a child’s adequate moral development. So, Thomas’s 
claim seems a tenuous foundation on which to rest the necessity of 
the family.
Finally, it is not clear that the kind of psychological security that 
Thomas considers a requisite for psychological autonomy does not 
come also or even exclusively from other sources. Thomas himself 
mentions past successes as a source of confidence in future situations. 
Perhaps success in negotiating the various problems and situations 
of life is what brings the sense of self-worth that engenders 
psychological security. Another possible source of psychological 
security is one’s national or cultural identity. Avishai Margalit and 
Joseph Raz suggest that one’s cultural identity is a primary source 
of psychological security and unconditional acceptance. The uncon­
ditional nature of cultural membership allows it to foster psycho­
logical security that in turn gives rise to moral autonomy.23 If either 
or both of these suggestions are correct, they would tend to mitigate 
the importance of the family in providing psychological security.
But even if unconditional love were necessary to foster psycho­
logical security, it is not clear that parents are the only source of 
that either. Perhaps the children receive such love in other situations 
as well. After all, if the appropriate sort of loving relationship can 
arise between an adoptive parent and child, it is difficult to see why 
such love might not also arise between other caretakers and children. 
Many people recall the support of a teacher or coach or baby-sitter 
whose concern and care extended beyond the bounds required by 
their employment. If such support is forthcoming in such non-familial 
situations, it seems quite possible that such support would arise 
within institutions of state-run child care.
In short, none of the explanations offered seems to justify family 
in the face of the inequalities it creates. Rawls’s explanation is 
unsatisfactory as it stands by the very criterion that Rawls himself 
laid down, and our attempt to find another justification for the 
necessity of the family has faltered as well, since there seem to be 
no familial functions that could not plausibly be fulfilled by well- 
funded, well-regulated, state-run child care. The loving support 
provided by a family hardly seems essential in an age in which 
commercial and communal child care abounds, even if we consider 
the particular, intense quality of parental love. Children seem to
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develop moral powers to the requisite degree in the absence of such 
parental support, and moreover, it is not clear that children do not 
receive needed love and other means of psychological security from 
other sources. So, Rawls’s problem remains. His commitment to 
equality of opportunity ought to lead him to advocate the abolition 
of the family in favor of more equitable, state-run child care.
3. Cultures, Comprehensive Doctrines, and Contexts of Choice
If the special status of the family is incompatible with the two 
principles as stated, it remains for us to attempt to alter the conception 
to protect the special status of the family, and show why the goods 
inherent to the family override the principle of fair equality of 
opportunity. It is not enough for us to simply emphasize our strong 
preference for the family, or take notice of the difficulties of making 
the transition to state-run child care. We must provide arguments as 
to why these preferences or difficulties are to be given weight by 
parties in the original position. What primary goods are at stake, 
and how do those weigh against the goods of self-realization ensured 
by the principle of fair equality of opportunity?
One promising avenue of justification for the family comes from 
its role as a transmitter of values and of cultural heritage. Will 
Kymlicka argues that cultural membership is so important that it 
ought to be protected as a primary good, as something that everyone 
is assumed to want, whatever else they want.24 Insofar as the family 
is a primary vehicle of transmitting cultural membership, the defense 
of such cultural transmission becomes also a defense of the family. 
This line of defense will be successful, however, only if it can be 
shown that the family is a necessary and not merely sufficient 
condition for the transmission of cultural membership. Moreover, it 
must be the case that the primary good of cultural membership is 
of sufficient weight to override the goods ensured by the principle 
of fair equality of opportunity.
a. Conceptions of the Good and Cultural Membership
Rawls’s political theory characterizes people as being motivated by 
particular conceptions of the good. Rawls says:
Such a conception must not be understood narrowly but rather as including a 
conception of what is valuable in human life. Thus, a conception of the good 
normally consists of a more or less determinate scheme of final ends, that is, ends 
we want to realize for their own sake, as well as attachments to other persons and
282 Ron Mallon
loyalties to various groups and associations. These attachments and loyalties give 
rise to devotions and affections, and so the flourishing of the persons and associations 
who are the objects of these sentiments is also part of our conception of the good. 
We also connect with such a conception a view of our relation to the world—  
religious, philosophical, and moral—by reference to which the value and significance 
of our ends and attachments are understood.
In a liberal society, people form certain rational life plans that are 
centered around their rich, particular conceptions of the good. 
Individual liberties are insisted upon since they protect the ability 
of individuals both to exercise their own diverse conceptions of the 
good and to revise and change their life plans as their ends and 
strategies change.
Kymlicka’s argument aims to show that, like basic liberties, 
cultural membership is required in order for individuals to exercise 
their own conception of the good, and to revise and change their 
life plans. How is this so? Kymlicka writes:
From childhood on, we become aware both that we are already participants in 
certain forms of life (familial, religious, sexual, educational, etc.), and that there 
are other ways of life which offer alternative models and roles that we may, in 
time, come to endorse. We decide how to live our lives by situating ourselves in 
these cultural narratives, by adopting roles that have struck us as worthwhile ones, 
as ones worth living (which may, of course, include the roles we were brought up 
to occupy). . . .  our language and history are the media through which we come 
to an awareness of the options available to us, and their significance; and this is 
a precondition of making intelligent judgements about how to lead our lives.
Cultural membership is a very important good because it, like the 
basic liberties, is essential to the possession of a meaningful capacity 
to exercise and revise one’s conception of the good, and those 
deprived of cultural membership are inevitably at a disadvantage 
with respect to forming, revising, and pursuing the fulfillment of 
their conception of the good. So, Kymlicka argues, cultural mem­
bership ought to be regarded by liberals as a primary good, and it 
ought to be protected by group differentiated rights where threatened.
This view of the importance of culture in the formation of our 
conceptions of the good coheres well with Rawls’s claim in TOJ 
that
[t]he many associations of varying sizes and aims [in a community] . . . simplify 
decision by offering definite ideals and forms of life that have been developed and 
tested by innumerable individuals, sometimes for generations. Thus in drawing up 
our plan of life we do not start de novo; we are not required to choose from 
countless possibilities without given structure or fixed contours.
Choices and modifications to our conceptions of the good are made 
within a context of values and choices which are identified, provided
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by and made salient by one’s particular cultural and historical up­
bringing.
Two features of a cultural structure or context are relevant in 
these passages from Kymlicka and Rawls. First, cultural structures 
provide a set of social roles, values and ideals, and life ends from 
which to choose. They provide what Kymlicka calls a context of 
choice. And second, these social roles, ideals, and life ends themselves 
are the value-laden product of a history and tradition. As such, they 
are not merely any social roles, but instead they reflect the various 
ideals, goods, and aims in a culture. Both Rawls and Kymlicka 
suggest that these options themselves offer an advantage over 
“starting fresh,” as the options presented by a culture have been 
historically tested and refined.28 Note that if they didn’t think this, 
it would be unclear why having access to these narratives and roles 
would offer any substantial advantage (other than as a time-saving 
heuristic).
Nor are the roles and values of a culture exhaustive: it is not the 
case that all possible or desirable ideals, norms, or conceptions of 
the good can be found within a given culture. It is for this reason 
that Kymlicka insists on the right of individuals not only to choose 
among the values offered to them by their cultural structures, but 
also to adopt conceptions of the good affirming values and ideals 
from outside the culture.29
Having the good of cultural membership, then, means having a 
starting place in forming and revising one’s conception of the good—a 
starting place characterized by alternative narratives and ideals 
representing a particular tradition and a preferred subset of possible 
conceptions of the good. We can think of cultures—understood as 
contexts of choice—as being one or more of what Rawls calls 
comprehensive or partially comprehensive doctrines. According to 
Rawls, such a doctrine “includes conceptions of what is of value in 
human life, and ideals of personal character, as well as ideals of 
friendship and of familial and associational relationships, and much 
else that is to inform our conduct, and in the limit to our life as a 
whole.”30
It is against the background of a comprehensive doctrine or 
doctrines made salient by one’s culture that persons have a meaningful 
ability to form and revise their conception of the good.31 Cultural 
membership allows individuals to “become aware, in a vivid way, 
of the options available to them, and intelligently examine their 
value.” Without the good of cultural membership, Kymlicka argues,
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individuals will lack the conceptual and institutional resources to 
evaluate and explore their life options. As such, liberals ought to 
consider cultural membership an important primary good.
b. Ranking Cultural Membership
Now, Rawls’s two principles of justice embody equal distribution of 
liberty, opportunity, and wealth, but assign these goods certain values 
of priority as well (e.g., the priority of liberty). If we are to add 
cultural membership to the list of primary goods, it will have to be 
assigned a priority relative to these other primary goods. And if this 
assignment is to justify the family, despite its creation of inequality, 
it must be ranked more highly than the goods of the second principle 
that guarantees equality of opportunity.
Is such a ranking of cultural membership justified, though? The 
second principle guarantees a certain amount of equality in a 
well-ordered society. Such equality is warranted, it is said, since it 
is wrong for morally arbitrary differences in opportunity and talent 
to result in greatly enhanced opportunities for some to pursue their 
conceptions of the good. If what we have said about the role of 
cultural context is correct, viable cultural transmission is a pre­
condition for meaningful formation and revision of a conception of 
the good. So the protection of cultural membership, like the protection 
of basic liberties, takes priority over the equality of opportunity 
guaranteed by the second principle. The need to allow cultural 
transmission then could justify the creation of inequality if such 
inequality were shown to be necessary.34
Notice that even if all of this is correct, even if cultural membership 
is a primary good that ought to be protected, we have at best provided 
an argument for some cultural transmission to a child. The con­
siderations given do not justify the protection of any particular 
cultural transmission to a child. So while cultural institutions must 
be protected, it is not necessary that any particular cultural tradition 
or doctrine—considered in isolation—be protected from change or 
alteration. What we need to protect is a context of choice.
c. The Defense of the Family
Regarding cultural membership as an important primary good 
provides an interesting and potentially powerful justification for the 
family. Since the family in its various forms provides the primary 
means of instilling a cultural heritage and cultural position in a child,
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protecting cultural membership might require protecting the family. 
Insofar as the family is a necessary condition for instilling and 
preserving cultural membership, the family would be justified in its 
creation of inequality.
In order for this argument to successfully ground the special status 
of the family, two things must be true. First, cultural membership 
must be appropriately regarded as a primary good. Given the central 
role that cultural narratives and values play in allowing one to 
negotiate one’s way in the world, and to devise and revise a 
conception of the good, this assumption would appear to be well- 
grounded, though I don’t pretend to have proven this here. In addition, 
we still need an argument as to the insufficiency of state-run insti­
tutions to transmit culture.
Remember that Lloyd proposed that the family was necessary to 
foster the required moral development of children. While it does 
seem possible that the family does, at least in the best cases, best 
promote the moral development of children, we found it implausible 
that the family was necessary to achieve a sufficient level of moral 
development. Since there seems to be no reason why a state-run 
institution could not also foster the moral development of children 
to the requisite degree, we found no justification for the special 
status of the family in a just society.
Now our problem is analogous: what we need is an argument to 
show that state-run institutions cannot promote cultural membership, 
and provide a context of choice for children to a certain acceptable 
level. Again, it is not necessary that the state perform as well as 
the family in such transmission, but only that the state do a sufficient 
job. In the next section I will attempt to provide an argument that 
the state cannot, in principle, perform this task.36
4. Liberalism and Political Liberalism
In this section, I will argue that the well-ordered society of Rawls’s 
PL is fundamentally unable to establish state-run child-rearing 
institutions that transmit culture and thus it is incapable of ensuring 
the primary good of cultural membership to children in its care. As 
a result, culture must be transmitted by nonpublic associations like 
families—a function that renders families necessary.
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a. From TOJ to PL: The Overlapping Consensus and the
Limits of Public Reason
John Rawls’s recent book Political Liberalism marks an important 
change from his earlier A Theory of Justice—a change founded on 
what Rawls sees as the earlier work’s unrealistic assumptions of the 
political stability of any liberal state justified by a comprehensive 
moral doctrine. In A Theory o f Justice, the justification of justice as 
fairness results from embracing a particular comprehensive philo­
sophical doctrine that provides a moral foundation for it. The 
problem with this earlier conception, as Rawls now sees it, is that 
it rests on an unrealistic view of the stability of a liberal society. 
Rawls now believes that if left unchecked by oppressive or 
authoritarian means, people will come to hold differing but reasonable 
conceptions of the good. And over time, they will come to endorse 
diverse and incompatible—but nonetheless reasonable—comprehen­
sive or partially comprehensive moral, religious, and philosophical 
doctrines. But, Rawls notes, the stability of a democratic regime 
rests on the support of a substantial majority of the politically active 
citizenry. So, the fact of “reasonable pluralism” undermines the 
stability of any liberal democratic regime justified solely in reference 
to a single comprehensive philosophical, religious, or moral doctrine.
In order to resolve this problem of stability, Rawls offers up a 
“political conception of justice” : a conception whose content is still 
specified by the two principles of justice, but whose justification 
now stems from an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehen­
sive doctrines. The political conception of justice is endorsed from 
within individual comprehensive and partially comprehensive doc­
trines as a basis for justice and mutual toleration. Rawls believes it 
is possible that an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehen­
sive doctrines can be reached on a political conception of justice, 
and that the political conception of justice can, in turn, form the 
foundation of a well-ordered though pluralistic society.39
The political conception of justice is importantly limited by “public 
reason”—“the reason of equal citizens who, as a collective body, 
exercise final political and coercive power over one another in 
enacting laws and in amending their constitution.”40 Public reason 
is a constrained sort of reason-giving to be used when citizens discuss 
and debate constitutional essentials and issues of basic justice. The 
constraints governing public reason require that citizens “be ready 
to explain the basis of their actions to one another in terms each 
could reasonably expect that others might endorse as consistent with
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their freedom and equality.”41 Public reason provides a standard by 
which one is to abide when justifying oneself, for example, to those 
who hold different comprehensive doctrines. Such a circumscribed 
technique of justification is important to the well-ordered society of 
PL, since the members of this political society are assumed to affirm 
reasonable but contradictory conceptions of the good. Without an 
agreed upon format for discussing and resolving differences, debate 
would quickly devolve into a discussion of the possibly irreconcilable 
differences of the actors’ comprehensive doctrines.
Rawls distinguishes public reasons, those that one “could rea­
sonably expect others might endorse,” from nonpublic reasons whose 
justifications stem from a particular comprehensive doctrine or partial 
comprehensive doctrine. Such nonpublic reasons include those of 
“churches and universities, scientific societies and professional 
groups”—groups that have internal methods of inquiry and standards 
of adequacy which are particular to the doctrines they exemplify. 
More generally, Rawls says that “ [n]onpublic reasons comprise the 
many reasons of civil society and belong to what I have called the 
‘background culture’ in contrast with the public political culture.”43
On Rawls’s later view, the doctrines internal to our various 
associations, commitments, and ways of life are permissible means 
of justifying and regulating those institutions. But the political 
conception of justice is justified by appeal to an overlapping con­
sensus of diverse but reasonable doctrines, so appeal to the internal 
reasons of one of these doctrines cannot serve to justify governmental 
acts on issues of justice, since such a nonpublic reason could not 
be expected to be endorsed by other reasonable doctrines within the 
overlapping consensus.
So, in the well-ordered society of PL, but not that of TOJ, public 
reason is to guide our reasoning in public matters, including the 
discussions within legislative bodies, the campaign speeches of 
political candidates, the voting choices of individual citizens, and 
the deliberations of the supreme court. Policies that cannot be justified 
by public reason will not be part of the basic structure of the 
well-ordered society.
b. The Necessity of Family and the Insufficiency of the State
What we needed was a reason why the state could not directly 
transmit cultural membership—a reason that would, by disqualifying 
state-run child care, reveal the necessity of the family. In what 
remains of this section, I shall make two claims. First, I will claim
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that the theory of justice in TOJ is incapable of revealing the necessity 
of the family, since “justice as fairness” is there underwritten by 
appeal to a single comprehensive doctrine. Secondly, and more 
importantly, I will argue that the political conception of justice offered 
in PL does reveal why the family is necessary once you regard 
cultural membership as a primary good.
Let us again consider the connection between cultural membership 
and a particular conception of the good. A conception of the good, 
as Rawls uses it, includes “a conception of what is valuable in a 
human life,” and it also involves “a view of our relation to the 
world—religious, philosophical, and moral—by reference to which 
the value and significance of our ends . . .  are understood.”44 Cultural 
membership is essential because it outfits us with such a rich array 
of options to determine what is valuable, and also because it provides 
us a context in which to pursue and revise those values. So, in 
transmitting a culture, we are transmitting a preferred subset of 
possible conceptions of the good. While one’s particular conception 
of the good can be modified through later reflection, one’s cultural 
inheritance provides the starting place within which such modification 
takes place.
In transmitting a culture, not only must such a rich array of what 
is valuable be made available, but the ideals and goods it embodies 
must be taught to the child as (at least mostly) true ideals for human 
life. If the collection of narratives and ideals of a cultural conception 
did not reflect ways in which the way the world actually is or how 
people ought to live, it could not play its role of providing the 
foundation as a starting place for evaluating actions and ideas, life 
options, and life ends. So families, churches, and other cultural 
institutions instill a cultural position as a doctrine about the Good, 
about human lives and what things are valuable.
In TOJ the conception of justice is underwritten by the endorsement 
of a comprehensive philosophical doctrine. Such a doctrine also 
embodies “conceptions of what is of value in human life, and ideals 
of personal character, as well as ideals of friendship and of familial 
and associational relationships, and much else that is to inform our 
conduct, and in the limit to our life as a whole”—in short, it 
embodies conceptions of the good 45
The comprehensive doctrine that justifies the conception of justice 
within TOJ itself implies a whole range of values and evaluations. 
Since the justification for the conception of justice in TOJ is grounded 
in the truth of this comprehensive doctrine, a government ordered
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by such a conception can promote or implement the values of this 
doctrine within the institutions of the basic structure. And so it ought 
to be able to promote cultural membership via the establishment of 
cultural institutions that reflect the various conceptions of the good 
embodied in the comprehensive doctrine that provides the foundation 
for the conception of justice.
One can imagine the basic structure of TOJ including a sort of 
rich civic culture, the values of which are passed on to each new 
generation in state-run child care institutions. In such a state, the 
demands of both cultural membership and equality of opportunity 
would seem to be satisfied. So, from the point of view of TOJ (or 
any state justified by reference to a single comprehensive doctrine), 
the need for cultural membership provides no compelling justification 
for the family in the face of the demands for equality of opportunity.
In PL, however, Rawls shifts to a political conception of justice 
and introduces the overlapping consensus and the constraints of 
public reason. Instead of finding its justification within a particular 
comprehensive doctrine, the political conception of justice is a 
freestanding doctrine, a “module,” that “fits into and can be 
supported by various reasonable comprehensive doctrines that endure 
in the society regulated by it.”46 Since the state’s authority derives 
from the mandate provided by the overlapping consensus, the state’s 
authority is also limited by that mandate—limited by public reason.
Public reason requires that policies governing issues of basic 
justice be justified by reasons that everyone could reasonably accept. 
Government—including judges, political candidates, legislators, and 
policy-makers—is constrained by public reason from advancing the 
contentious views of particular comprehensive doctrines in discussion 
over issues of constitutional essentials and basic justice. Indeed, any­
one wishing it to do so is unreasonable.
But the state is prohibited from advancing the particular elements 
and the decidedly nonpublic reasons of comprehensive doctrines. To 
do so would favor certain comprehensive doctrines (and the concep­
tions of the good they made salient) above others, and this is precisely 
what a state governed by ideals of public reason cannot do. The 
limits imposed by public reason prevent the state from imposing 
particular elements of one or another comprehensive doctrine upon 
others who view that doctrine as irrelevant, an obstruction, or just 
incorrect. In the case of adults, these limits protect adults from 
unwanted intrusion into their personal and associational lives.
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Children are a special case, for they have no ongoing conception 
of the good or comprehensive doctrine that would be interfered with 
by state sponsorship of one or another doctrine. It is not clear, for 
example, that if the state raised children to practice a particular 
religion, any harm would be done to the children, at least if the two 
principles of justice were otherwise honored. Nonetheless, adults in 
a state governed by a political conception of justice could be expected 
to object to the state and its various institutions being used to 
explicitly advance particular comprehensive doctrines, the specifics 
of which are at odds with their own reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines.
To suggest that the state advocate such particular comprehensive 
doctrines, and advocate them as true, is to ask that the state be used 
unreasonably, to promote values and doctrines that are not justified 
by the overlapping consensus and that agents with different compre­
hensive doctrines could not reasonably be expected to accept. So, 
in a state governed by a political conception of justice, no reasonable 
people could ask that the state advance their own comprehensive 
doctrine. But children need to be initiated into a cultural position 
that is itself a comprehensive doctrine or set of comprehensive 
doctrines. So the state cannot, in principle, provide for the needs of 
children in its care.
To recap, I have argued both that justice as fairness ought to 
endorse cultural membership as a primary good, and that a 
government ordered by justice as fairness endorsed as a political 
conception is precluded by the limits of public reason from directly 
advancing any particular comprehensive doctrine. It is for this reason, 
I suggest, that we need the family—a cultural institution that fulfills 
a role that cannot, in principle, be carried out by a state organized 
around a political conception of justice.
Notice that the family can play this role in transmitting culture 
even as it takes advantage of the many community institutions that 
aid in child-rearing, including schools, baby-sitters, churches, youth 
groups, and so on. As long as the family fulfills its responsibility 
to select such institutions in ways that conform to or are compatible 
with the values inherent in its members’ comprehensive doctrines, 
it will simultaneously be using such opportunities to transmit cultural 
membership to its youth.
While these considerations do argue in favor of a family, they do 
not, by themselves, favor a particular form of the family. As such,
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they are compatible with most of the many, many forms of family 
that exist in various cultural, ethnic, and religious communities.
5. Some Objections and Clarifications
Objection 1: If society must provide for cultural membership, then 
wouldn’t that still violate public reason?
In section 3, I argued that cultural membership is a primary good 
of sufficient importance to override the concern for equality. But if 
society must ensure cultural transmission through governmental 
structures, that would appear to violate the mandate of the overlapping 
consensus as surely as state-operated child care would. The appro­
priate way to understand the protection of cultural membership, then, 
is as a negative right of the child: a right to acquire culture within 
the family, unimpeded by considerations of equal opportunity.
On this conception, might not some children then be deprived of 
cultural membership because of the lack of available resources? If 
a particular culture required special or extravagant resources in order 
to ensure the good of cultural membership, then children bom into 
such a culture will be at a disadvantage in acquiring that particular 
cultural doctrine.
If we understand culture as one or a set of comprehensive doc­
trines, however, it is difficult to see why children would be at a 
disadvantage in acquiring the doctrine. What seems more likely is 
that some doctrines make salient conceptions of the good that require 
more resources to lead a fulfilling life than others might. Children 
who acquire such comprehensive doctrines will indeed be at a 
disadvantage in fulfilling their conception of the good.
In this way, however, children are at no more disadvantage relative 
to their claim on material resources than anyone else whose 
conception of the good requires extra resources. It is an assumption 
of Rawls’s theory that “citizens are thought to be capable of adjusting 
their aims and aspirations in the light of what they can reasonably 
expect to provide for.”48
If leading a good life according to one or another doctrine does 
not demand large or peculiar resources, however, then we can expect 
that the material basis of cultural transmission would be provided 
for by the system of primary goods and their distribution in the 
well-ordered society according to the difference principle. Since the 
system of primary goods makes no assumptions about particular
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comprehensive doctrines, it is supported by the conception of justice 
founded in the overlapping consensus.
Objection 2: The state could teach comprehensive doctrines if  the 
need was supported by public reasons.
The argument presented suggests that if state institutions raised 
children within a culture, the state would be advancing one or another 
particular comprehensive doctrine, and suggests that this would be 
unacceptable since reasonable people could not be expected to agree 
to the use of state power to advance a particular comprehensive 
doctrine at odds with their own reasonable conception. However, it 
may be that despite the objectionable nature of the content of the 
particular comprehensive doctrine, the policy itself—that of the 
government ensuring children the good of cultural membership—  
could be defended by offering public reasons alone.
Rawls’s discussion of school prayer is suggestive:
Take the question of school prayer. One might suppose that a liberal position on 
this would reject their admissibility in public schools. But why so? We have to 
consider all the political values that can be invoked to settle this question and on 
which side the decisive reasons fall. The famous case of the debate in the Virginia 
House of Delegates in 1785 between Patrick Henry and James Madison over the 
establishment of the Anglican Church and involving religion in the schools was 
argued almost entirely by reference to political values alone.49
Rawls goes on to say in a footnote that
[t]he special interest of the example of school prayer is that it shows that the idea 
of public reason is not a view about specific political institutions or policies, but 
a view about how they are to be argued for and justified to the citizen body that 
must decide the question.
If cultural membership is so important in allowing individuals to 
develop and revise their conceptions of the good, then that provides 
a public reason for its implementation in state-run child care facilities. 
There would still be the issue as to exactly which children should 
be raised according to which comprehensive doctrine. No one could 
reasonably be expected to assent to all children being raised within 
a comprehensive doctrine that they found mistaken, but perhaps the 
state could raise a certain proportion of children according to doctrine 
A, another proportion according to doctrine B, and so on. Such a 
solution might allow the state to transmit cultural belonging, but 
without sacrificing its impartiality among comprehensive doctrines.
Even if an agreement as to appropriate proportioning of children 
could be reached, this solution would not work. Remember the point
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of undertaking such measures would be to create formal and material 
inequality among children in the state’s care. But presumably a 
substantial amount of the inequality brought about by real families 
stems from the different cultural milieu that each inhabits. Because 
of the differences between their inherited comprehensive doctrines 
and conceptions of the good, people will differ in their capacity to 
pursue various goals.
Consider an extreme but illustrative example: if someone is brought 
up in a community that eschews technology and so has limited early 
contact with computers, but comes over time and experience to want 
to be a computer animator, that person could be at a substantial 
disadvantage relative to someone else brought up by computer 
animators in Silicon Valley. Even if the state could reproduce the 
different cultural milieus, it would do so at the cost of being unable 
to eliminate the inequality of opportunity these milieus presented to 
the children involved. For another example, consider historic Christian 
prohibitions against usury that had the effect of creating inequalities 
between abiding Christians and others. Differences in cultural 
doctrines bring inequities in their wake. To attempt to eliminate these 
inequities is to try to eliminate precisely the differences in particular 
conceptions of the good that basic liberties protect. Since eliminating 
such inequality was the whole reason to have the state raise children 
in the first place, its hard to see how such a policy of publicly 
raising children in unequal circumstances could be justified.
Objection 3: At best you’ve shown that the state cannot raise children, 
but not that the family has to. Perhaps community facilities or religious 
organizations could raise children instead.
This objection is correct, to a point. In eliminating the state as an 
institution for raising children, I did leave open the possibility that 
other institutions besides the family—institutions governed by their 
own internal doctrines and not limited by public reason—could raise 
children. In fact, I even suggested at the end of Section 4 that 
families could take extensive advantage of such institutions.
So, it does remain a viable cultural option for children to be 
raised in some sort of communal setting outside the traditional family. 
Notice though, that if the motivation for doing this was to ensure 
equality of opportunity, then it will inevitably fall short. As we 
mentioned above (Objection 2), inequalities go hand in hand with 
differences in cultural positions or comprehensive doctrines. So even 
if those who shared a culture raised their children in common, these
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children would nonetheless be unequal in various ways from other 
children raised in different cultural settings and in different familial 
arrangements.
Conclusion
The attachment to the family is so abiding and so deep that if 
liberalism entails its abolition, most would take that not as support 
for state-run child care, but as evidence that liberalism is wrong. 
The present account provides no illumination as to the special claims 
that parents have to their own children. While it seems certain that 
parents have strong prerogatives concerning the welfare and 
upbringing of their children, such prerogatives are not explored here, 
since I have supposed that liberal theory ought to regard any such 
parental rights as overridden in the face of injustice to children. On 
this assumption, parental rights are irrelevant to the present dis­
cussion.
There are lots of other issues that remain open here as well, in 
part because the justification of the family that I have provided does 
not favor particular conceptions of the family. So, for example, while 
it is true that ensuring cultural membership might require protection 
of the family, it is still not clear that it protects the biological family. 
Insofar as participation in any culture is sufficient to provide a child 
with cultural membership, the child will experience no deprivation.
I have argued that TOJ appears to entail the consequence that 
children ought to be raised by the state in order to reduce or eliminate 
differential outcomes resulting from morally arbitrary conditions. 
While Rawls and Lloyd both recognize this consequence, neither 
they nor Thomas provide a satisfactory justification for the special 
status of the family in constraining the second principle of justice.
A satisfactory answer to our problem can be found if we consider 
both cultural membership to be a primary good, and we consider 
the well-ordered society to be governed not by a comprehensive 
moral or political doctrine, but by a political conception of justice. 
For recognizing the importance of cultural membership means 
allowing each child to attain it. But the political conception of justice 
restricts the state from transmitting many elements of any culture or 
broad conception of the possibilities of human life, so the family is 
a necessary institution for a well-ordered liberal society governed by 
a political conception of justice.
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The family is a special institution in the basic structure since it 
can instill children with a sense of cultural belonging, an important 
primary good. Nonetheless, as a private association, it is free from 
the limits placed on public life—limits that would exclude precisely 
the rich, culturally laden doctrines that children need to foster the 
concepts, values, purposes, and selves that are required to negotiate 
successfully the many challenges of life.51
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